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striking magnitude. Although many ﬁelds of studies including epi-
demiology, sociology, and psychology try to identify determinants for
medical nonpersistence, comprehensive research to explain medical
nonpersistence from an economics perspective is rather scarce.
Objectives: The aim of the study was to develop a conceptual frame-
work that augments standard economic choice theory with psycho-
logical concepts of behavioral economics to understand how
patients’ preferences for discontinuing with therapy arise over the
course of the medical treatment. The availability of such a frame-
work allows the targeted design of mechanisms for intervention
strategies. Methods: Our conceptual framework models the patient
as an active economic agent who evaluates the beneﬁts and costs
for continuing with therapy. We argue that a combination of loss
aversion and mental accounting operations explains why patients
discontinue with therapy at a speciﬁc point in time. We designed a
randomized laboratory economic experiment with a student subjectee front matter Copyright & 2014, International S
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y.pool to investigate the behavioral predictions. Results: Subjects
continue with therapy as long as experienced utility losses have to be
compensated. As soon as previous losses are evened out, subjects
perceive the marginal beneﬁt of persistence lower than in the beginning
of the treatment. Consequently, subjects start to discontinue with
therapy. Conclusions: Our results highlight that concepts of behavioral
economics capture the dynamic structure of medical nonpersistence
better than does standard economic choice theory. We recommend that
behavioral economics should be a mandatory part of the development of
possible intervention strategies aimed at improving patients’ compli-
ance and persistence behavior.
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Poor treatment persistence with prescribed medicines has long
been recognized as a major obstacle for effective treatment and
health care efﬁciency [1–3]. More recent studies for a wide range of
chronic diseases such as asthma, diabetes, and hypertension
reveal that only 50% to 65% of the patients adhere to the
recommended medication usage [4–7]. The deviation from the
prescribed medication-taking behavior exposes the patient to
higher risks and leads to poorer health outcomes and increased
morbidity and mortality [2,8,9]. The associated costs for additional
health care services and forgone investments for the development
and utilization of new and efﬁcacious but ultimately ineffective
drugs and therapies have escalated into billions of dollars annu-
ally [10–14]. Employers report poor health habits as the main
challenge to maintaining affordable beneﬁts [15].
Traditionally, one approach to shortcomings in patient behav-
ior has been to view the problem as information gap. Variousinterventions aimed at enhancing medication persistence, such
as patient education and training, feedback loops and reinforce-
ment, or drug presentation and functionality, were shown to be
at best moderately effective and rather limited in promoting
sustained behavior change [16–19].
A second approach to realign behaviors is to provide the patient
with ﬁnancial incentives. Once considered as a promising approach
toward achieving healthy behavior, the effectiveness of their use
remains insufﬁcient and inconclusive, leaving many questions
about potential modiﬁers including form, size, and duration of
different ﬁnancial incentive programs unanswered [20,21].
These empirical ﬁndings strongly suggest that the problem of
nonpersistence is rooted in numerous causes and requires
interventions that use insights from different ﬁelds of studies
including epidemiology, psychology, sociology, and economics
[11,22]. Researchers have started bridging behavioral economics
and health to understand how potential modiﬁers rooted in the
psychology of patients such as reasoning fallacies, cognitiveociety for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
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Fig. 1 – Three phases in a stylized medical treatment for chronic diseases.
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decision-making process and prevent behavioral changes. Under-
standing human biases allows constructing levers through tech-
nologies, social networks, gamiﬁcation, contracts, and incentives.
Employers, insurers, pharmacy beneﬁt managers, and companies
are starting to experiment with approaches using behavioral
insights [23–28]. Comprehensive research about the reasons of
nonpersistence from the behavioral economics perspective, how-
ever, is scarce. Although patients are viewed as economic agents
who perform a cost-beneﬁt analysis when deciding about medi-
cation intake [29], the empirical application of economic models to
derive individual determinants of nonpersistence and to predict
behavior is limited [22]. The reasons why the existing research in
health care is slow on that matter is manifold and apparent:1. The few attempts to economically explain medical nonpersis-
tence only consider rational choice behavior and ignore
promising approaches from behavioral economics that aug-
ment standard economic theory along with greater psycho-
logical realism [30].2. There is no theoretical framework that captures the dynamic
nature of medication-taking behavior and links the individual
decision to the observed outcome over time.3. The empirical research based on observational data or clinical
studies lacks the ability to identify the general drivers of the
patient’s decision-making process to discontinue with ther-
apy. Instead, existing clinical meta-analyses and retrospective
studies identify determinants that imply correlations rather
than causal relationships with observed outcomes [31].4. With a focus on clinical trials (randomized and controlled as
well as pragmatic) to assess the impact of behavioral incen-
tives, there is a lack of a scalable approach to design, test, and
calibrate tailored incentive schemes.
The aim of the study is to explain medical nonpersistence
from an economics perspective. We develop a conceptual frame-
work that augments standard economic choice behavior with
psychological concepts of behavioral economics to understand
how patients’ preferences for discontinuing with therapy arise
over the course of the treatment. This integrated model incorpo-
rates the key features of a medical treatment and generates
numerous behavioral predictions. Using the method of experi-
mental economics, the predictions are validated within an
economic setting, allowing for general conclusions about the
individual’s decision-making process and economic behavior in
medical treatments. We proceed as follows. In a ﬁrst step, we
describe the different concepts of our framework and illustrate
how we abstract from the medical context and create anequivalent economic environment to clearly isolate the potential
economic drivers of medical nonpersistence. In a second step, we
explain the method of experimental economics and present how
we designed a randomized economic experiment to validate the
applicability of the conceptual framework by testing the under-
lying behavioral hypotheses under controlled conditions.Methods
Conceptual Framework
We build upon a discrete choice framework that models the patient
as an active agent who evaluates the beneﬁts and costs for
continuing with therapy and decides upon the assessment of this
trade-off. Referring to the typical decreasing shape of persistence
behavior observed in clinical studies [4,7,12,13,32,33], we argue that
this assessment on the part of the patient varies along the treat-
ment and identify three phases: 1) the phase of invasion, 2) the
phase of high persistence, and 3) the phase in which discontinua-
tion with therapy is expected to occur (Fig. 1). The phase of invasion
represents the beginning of the medical treatment. The patient is
managing access to the medicine and takes the medicine without
experiencing any improvements because a certain time and a
certain threshold level are needed for the medicine to become
efﬁcacious. After this threshold level is met, patients are observed
to comply extremely well (“phase of high persistence”), yet fail to do
so at a speciﬁc point in time and then start discontinuing with
therapy (“phase of expected variation in persistence behavior”).
Assuming that the costs and beneﬁts are constant throughout the
treatment, standard rational choice theory is unable to explain the
behavioral deviation in the third phase. Once agreeing to the
treatment and complying well at the beginning, the patient is
always better off by continuing with therapy.
A broad range of empirical studies conclude that individuals
fall prey to reasoning fallacies and do not make perfectly rational
decisions because rationality may be limited by time, risk and
uncertainty, incomplete information on alternatives, and com-
plexity [23,34–37]. We therefore build our conceptual framework
on the principles of behavioral economics and include limited
human rationality into the economic decision-making process.
The patients’ decision-making process is assumed to follow the
concept of mental accounting [38,39]. This concept has been used
to explain a wide range of consumption and spending behavior
[40,41]. The economic evaluation of alternatives follows the
prospect theory [42] and is modeled by a special value function
whose shape exhibits three essential characteristics (Fig. 2): 1) the
value function is deﬁned over gains and losses relative to some
Fig. 2 – The value function deﬁned over gains and losses
under the prospect theory.
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gain, and likewise, the disvalue of a loss both increase at a
diminishing rate. Hence, the value function is concave in the
domain of gains and convex in the domain of losses. 3) Last, the
value function incorporates the notion of loss aversion, which
means that losses are valued more than gains. The dynamics of
this value function indicates that beneﬁts and costs can be
evaluated differently depending on the timing and the current
wealth status. Indeed, Thaler and Johnson [43] ﬁnd evidence that
future gains are valued less if previous losses are compensated
and the possibility to break even or enter the sphere of gaining is
at hand. This causes individuals to deviate from a formerly risk-
averse strategy to more risk-seeking behavior. A combination of
loss aversion as described by prospect theory and mental
accounting operations can thus systematically inﬂuence the
decision for a speciﬁc option and might explain why patientsTable 1 – Similarities between a medical treatment and
Setting Objective Duration
Medical
treatment
Maintain initial
health state
Treatment is
scheduled for
several time
periods
Patien
betw
opt
con
disc
the
Economic
investment
setting
Maintain initial
wealth status
Investment plan
is scheduled
for several
time periods
Invest
betw
modevelop preferences to discontinue with therapy over the course
of the medical treatment. According to our conceptual frame-
work, the patient incurs costs during the phase of invasion. The
feeling of loss is due to the efforts required to manage access to
the medicine and the fact that the patient experiences the
inconvenience of the unfamiliar medication intake procedures
or therapy peculiarities without receiving any beneﬁts in terms of
health state improvements. After the medicine becomes efﬁca-
cious, the patient is highly compliant as a means to compensate
for the endured losses from the phase of invasion. Once the
losses are compensated, however, patients value any further
gains of being compliant lower and consequently tend to dis-
continue with therapy.Setting an Economic Environment
To examine whether this hypothesized behavioral pattern in fact
explains medical nonpersistence, we implement—in accordance
to the standard view of health as an investment good and part of
the human capital [44]—a simple investment setting over several
time periods.
Let us assume that a ﬁnancial investor has an initial wealth
status and agrees to a new investment plan that is scheduled
over several time periods. In each time period, the investor can
choose between two investment options: a risky option that not
only generates high revenue but also entails a higher risk of
losing money or a less risky option that not only generates lower
revenue but also has a far lower risk of losing money. Once
money is lost, there is no opportunity to invest anymore and the
investment plan is aborted. The same trade-off between beneﬁts
and costs associated with choices under risk and uncertainty can
be observed in medical treatments (see Table 1).
Starting the medical treatment with an initial health status,
the patient makes a choice between two options in each time
period: investing in health by continuing with therapy, which
maintains the current health status but incurs costs of persis-
tence (e.g., adverse effects and medication costs in form of co-
payments), or not investing in health by discontinuing with
therapy, which maintains the current health status at no cost
but entails a higher risk of suffering a noncompensable relapse.an economic investment setting.
Decision Costs/beneﬁts Outcomes
t decides
een two
ions:
tinuing or
ontinuing with
rapy
Continuing with
therapy:
 adverse effects/
decreased risk of
suffering a relapse
Discontinuing with
therapy:
 no adverse effects/
higher risk of
suffering a relapse
Health outcome is
linked to certain
probabilities that
are determined by
the decision to
continue with
therapy or not. If
relapse occurs, the
treatment is
cancelled.
or decides
een a less or
re risky option
Less risky option:
 higher investment
costs/decreased risk
of losing money
More risky option:
 no investment costs/
higher risk of
losing money
The subsequent
wealth status is
linked to certain
probabilities that
are determined by
the option chosen.
Once money is
lost, the
investment plan is
aborted.
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economic equivalent of the medical decision of continuing with
therapy or not. Choosing the less risky option represents con-
tinuing with therapy because it involves costs but decreases the
risk of obtaining the negative outcome such as suffering a
medical relapse. Choosing the risky option is equivalent to
discontinuing with therapy. In this case, no costs emerge, but
the risk of suffering a medical relapse is far higher. Both the
patient and the ﬁnancial investor face probabilistic risks and
corresponding consequences with their choices. If a noncompen-
sable relapse occurs, the medical treatment is cancelled. Con-
gruently, once money from the investment is lost, the
investment plan is aborted. The transformation of the medical
treatment to an equivalent investment setting enables us to
simulate the course of events inherent in medical treatments
from an economics perspective and isolates the economic drivers
of medical nonpersistence. For this reason, we validate the
applicability of our conceptual framework in the economic
environment by investigating whether investment behavior
dynamically changes from choosing the less risky option to
choosing the risky option over the course of an investment plan.
Medical Nonpersistence in an Economic Experiment
A common approach would be to analyze observational ﬁeld data
on behavior in investment decisions that exhibit characteristics
described in our conceptual framework. Those data, however, are
not available. Even if we had data on decisions comparable to our
investment setting, too many important factors such as the
market environment, the experience of the decision makers,
and particularities of the investment would be beyond the control
of the researcher and could therefore not be considered in the
statistical analysis. Economic experiments have emerged as a
vital component of economic research and are regarded as a
complement to other more traditional forms of empirical eco-
nomic analysis, such as observations and surveys [45,46]. Unlike
survey studies, which create a hypothetical environment with
hypothetical responses, experiments offer the possibility to
observe actual behavior based on real decisions under monetary
incentive conditions [47]. To explain patients’ persistence behav-
ior, we therefore embed the economic investment setting into an
experimental environment. As usually done, we run our eco-
nomic laboratory experiment with a student subject pool. The
reasons are that students have the ability to grasp abstract
situations more easily and quickly understand the rules of the
experiment [48]. Furthermore, as Amiel and Cowell [49] argue,
students serve as a better subject sample for testing the validity
of theoretical principles than do members of the general public
because their motivation is often tied to intuition or speciﬁc
situations, which, in many cases, have been proven a poor guide
to criteria of general applicability. Moreover, the predictions
derived from economic models, such as the behavioral economic
model used to explain the dynamics of medical nonpersistence in
the present article, are independent of assumptions concerning
participant pools [50]. Bleichrodt et al. [51] investigate the trade-
off between equity and efﬁciency in the allocation of health by
using the nonlinear rank-dependent quality-adjusted life-year
model. In an economic laboratory experiment, preferences areFig. 3 – The two stages of the experimentelicited both in a sample of Dutch students and in a sample from
the general population. No signiﬁcant differences are observed
between the views of the students and of the representative
sample of the Dutch population.
The experiment is modeled as a simple investment game and
consists of two stages (Fig. 3). The ﬁrst stage, called the working
stage, is intended to induce feelings of losses for the participating
subjects. Subjects invest effort and time in the laboratory to work
on a real task, which is known in the experimental literature as
the slider task [52]. The task is to position tiny sliders on the
computer screen. Subjects have no time limit for working on the
slider task and only when all 48 sliders are positioned correctly
the task is completed and subjects get paid for their work.
Subjects, however, get only a fraction of their proper income.
Instead of receiving 8 units of the experimental monetary
currency taler, they receive only 2 talers, and so subjects endure
a loss of 6 talers when they enter the second stage (income o 0).
The second stage is called the lottery stage and mimics the
investment plan scheduled for 12 time periods.
In each period, subjects choose between two investment
options: a risky lottery A or a less risky lottery B. Both lottery A
and lottery B generate the same monetary outcomes but differ in
the risk of receiving either the high or the low outcome of 2 or 0
talers, respectively. In lottery A, subjects have the chance to win
and receive 2 talers with a probability of 70% or lose the lottery
and receive 0 talers with a probability of 30%. The investment in
lottery A comes with no additional costs. Lottery B yields the
outcome of 2 talers with a far higher probability of 95% but
subjects have to pay 1 taler to play this less risky option. Once the
subjects have chosen between the two lotteries, a randomization
device determines whether the lottery is won or lost according to
the probabilities that are associated with each outcome of the
chosen lottery. A crucial feature of the experiment lies in the
“sudden death” mechanism. Once the subject loses the lottery,
the experiment is over. It is noteworthy that both lotteries may
lead to a dropout, but the probability for a dropout is far more
when opting for lottery A repeatedly. In the case of winning the
chosen lottery, the subject is able to again decide upon the
lotteries and the obtained money is cumulated over the single
periods. In the case of losing the lottery, no further decisions
about the lotteries in the next periods are possible, and so the
current account balance remains unchanged until the end of the
experiment. The experimental investment setting incorporates
the key features of a medical treatment and allows investigating
the behavioral predictions of our conceptual framework. The
working stage of the experiment mimics the phase of invasion,
whereas the lottery stage imitates patient’s decisions to discon-
tinue with therapy by choosing lottery A or to continue with
therapy by choosing lottery B. The dynamics of persistence
behavior is incorporated by loss aversion in the working stage
and repeated decisions on lotteries A and B in the lottery stage,
which precisely state at what period discontinuing with therapy
should be observed. Under standard economic choice theory, a
risk-neutral decision maker decides in favor of the lottery with
the highest expected value. Given the probabilities of each lottery
and the number of decisions to be made, the optimal decision
sequence would be to choose lottery B until period 10 and then
switch to lottery A for the two remaining periods (see Appendix Aand expected persistence with therapy.
Table 2 – Distribution of lottery choices A and B in
lottery stage.
Starting lottery in period 1 A (%) B (%)
Subjects (n ¼ 107) 19.70 80.03
Dropout rate (overall) 95.2 74.4
Survival rate until period 3 57.14 89.53
Survival rate until period 6 33.33 72.09
Survival rate until period 9 14.29 52.33
Survival rate until period 12 4.76 25.58
Note. Survival rate is the proportion of subjects who won all
chosen lotteries A and B, respectively, in the experiment until the
designated period.
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jval.2014.08.2669). In line with the evidence of Thaler and Johnson
[43], our conceptual framework suggests that the perception and
the evaluation of the risk component associated with each lottery
depend on the timing and the subject’s current wealth status.
Starting the lottery stage with a loss of 6 talers, it is predicted that
subjects choose lottery B constantly at the beginning of the
investment plan because this is the least risky strategy to
compensate for the losses endured in the working stage. Once
the losses are compensated, the reference point of the value
function is shifted upwards so that a nonnegative income
(income Z 0) leads the subject to value future gains lower than
before. This means that from period 7 onwards, when all losses
are compensated, subjects start to avoid the investment costs
and prefer the more risky option lottery A to lottery B, exhibiting
an investment behavior that dynamically changes over the
course of the investment plan.
Experimental Procedure
The experiment was conducted at the Business and Economic
Research Laboratory between September 2011 and December 2011
at the University of Paderborn. Subjects were randomly recruited
from a pool of approximately 1800 voluntary students from differ-
ent ﬁelds of study who are enrolled as prospective participants in
economic experiments. In total, 107 subjects participated in the
experiment of whom 56 (52.34%) were female and 51 (47.67%) were
male. The experiment was computerized and programmed with
the software zTree [53]. As soon as the subjects arrived at the
Business and Economic Research Laboratory, they were asked to
randomly draw a number from a box and were told to sit down at
the assigned computer workplace in a cubicle detached from each
other, ensuring complete anonymity. Subjects received the same
introductory talk and were told not to communicate during the
complete time in the laboratory. Then, the written instructions
(see Appendix B in Supplemental Materials found at http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.jval.2014.08.2669) were handed out and the subjects
had 10 minutes time to read and ask questions in private to clarify
any misunderstandings. The instructions were written in a
context-free manner so that no associations with medical treat-
ments, pharmacies, and so forth could emerge that might inﬂu-
ence subjects’ decisions in an uncontrolled way. In the
instructions, subjects were assured that all decisions were made
anonymously, so that neither the experimenter nor other partic-
ipants got to know the identity of the subject who made a speciﬁc
decision. Each subject had to decide only for himself or herself and
was not informed about the decisions of others. All decisions were
typed into the computer program. Subjects were informed that
their monetary earnings would be a function of their choices
during the experiment and would not depend on the decisions of
the other subjects. The earnings of the experiment were
exchanged from the experimental monetary currency taler to euro
and handed out in cash to the subjects right after the end of
experiment. The experiment lasted for about 1 hour and subjects
earned €16.83 on average. (The amount €16.83 was worth roughly
$22.55 at the time the experiment was conducted.)Results
Distribution of Lottery Choices A and B in the Investment Plan
Table 2 presents how the participating subjects decided between
the more risky lottery A and the less risky lottery B throughout
the lottery stage of the experiment. The vast majority of roughly
80% started the decision sequence with lottery B in the ﬁrst
period. Because the risk of dropping out of the experimentaccumulates with each lottery decision, the risk-dominant strat-
egy favors the constant choice of lottery B. In fact, when lottery B
was chosen, the average rate of dropping out of the experiment at
any point along the investment plan of 12 periods was 74.42%
compared with a dropout rate of 95.24% when subjects started
with lottery A. Looking at this result from the other perspective,
we see that subjects who constantly chose lottery B had a higher
chance of winning the lotteries and thus survive the single
periods. For example, only 57.14% of the subjects who constantly
chose lottery A survived the ﬁrst three periods, while roughly the
same proportion of subjects survived six periods more until
period 9, when lottery B was chosen.Persistence in Experimental Investment Setting
Our persistence measure is based on the lottery choices A and B in
the investment plan. In analogy to a medical treatment, the
participating subject is said to continue with therapy when he or
she chooses lottery B. Once lottery A is chosen, he or she is said to
discontinue with therapy. We deﬁne the persistence rate as the ratio
of lottery B over lottery A choices made by subjects per period. We
restrict our sample population to only those subjects who started
the investment plan with lottery B and either always continued
with therapy or discontinued with therapy at a certain point in time
by switching once from lottery B to A and then keeping the
constant choice of lottery A until the end of the scheduled
time periods or until they lost a lottery and dropped out of the
experiment. The reason for truncating the observational data is
that only those subjects serve as the population of interest who
agree on medical treatment in the beginning, stay with ther-
apy, or exhibit clear preferences for discontinuation at a
constant rate (Only 8 of 86 subjects who started with lottery B
in the beginning of the investment plan switch multiple times
between the two choices. The remaining 78 subjects either stay
with B, or stay with A, once they switched from B to A).
Figure 4 shows the persistence rate over the course of the 12
periods in the investment plan. Similar to clinical ﬁndings, we
observe that persistence decreases over time with different
intensity. In the beginning of the investment plan, the persis-
tence rate is well above 90% and decreases only slightly to
roughly 85% in period 7. From period 7 onwards, the likelihood
of observing a subject discontinuing with therapy rises continu-
ously, with many subjects starting to switch from lottery B to
lottery A, despite still being the risk-dominant choice of staying
with lottery B until period 10. Indeed, if we look at the decisions
of each subject over the course of action, we ﬁnd strong support
for the predictions of our conceptual framework. Table 3 illus-
trates the behavioral pattern of each individual from period t to
the next consecutive period t þ 1. Apart from the ﬁrst period,
there is no signiﬁcant change in individual choice behavior over
two consecutive periods until period 6. Consistent with the
Fig. 4 – Persistence rate in the experimental investment
setting.
Fig. 5 – Kaplan-Meier estimates of persistence curves
between the baseline experiment (BASE) and rational choice
behavior.
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wealth level, subjects prefer the less risky investment option and
choose lottery B to compensate for the endured losses from the
working stage.
Recall from the parameterization of the experiment that
subjects start the lottery stage with a loss of 6 talers and subjects’
income increases with each choice for lottery B by 1 taler. In line
with the empirical ﬁndings of Thaler and Johnson [43], subjects in
period 6 prefer the more risky lottery A because they have the
opportunity to reach the domain of gains with the next choice
and are therefore extremely risk-seeking in this situation. From
period 7 onwards, subjects are in the domain of gains. The
underlying value function has a concave shape in that domain,
so that the marginal increase of one additional monetary unit of
any further gain becomes less valuable, the closer subjects come
to the end of the investment plan. The consequences for the
assessment of the cost-beneﬁt trade-off of each lottery is that
subjects value the revenues of lottery B with each additional
period lower and therefore subsequently switch to choose the
more risky lottery A. This behavior is apparent in the steep
decrease in persistence in the interval between the periods 7 and
12. Further econometric analysis supports these nonparametric
results. For this purpose, we estimate a univariate logistic
regression with ﬁxed effects and use the choice of the lotteries
as the dependent variable (coding the choice of A ¼ 0 and B ¼ 1).
If we further include a dummy variable as independent variable,
which takes the value of 0 for the periods 1 to 6 and the value of 1
for the periods 7 to 12, we ﬁnd that the probability of choosing B
in the periods 7 to 12 is signiﬁcantly 45 percentage points lower
than in periods 1 to 6 (P ¼ 0.00; robust standard errors [boot-
strapped] ¼ 0.01982).Table 3 – Nonparametric McNemar test to assess the diff
next period.
Consecutive
periods
Period 1 vs. 2 Period 2 vs. 3 Period 3
McNemar χ2 (df ¼ 1) 8.00 (0.00) 1.29 (0.26) 0.33 (0.
Period 7 vs. 8 Period 8
McNemar χ2 (df ¼ 1) 3.57 (0.06) 7.00 (0.
Asymptotic P values in parentheses.Comparison with Rational Choice Behavior
The experimental ﬁndings so far suggest that subjects decide
according to the concept of mental accounting and evaluate the
costs and beneﬁts of continuing with therapy consistent with the
predictions of our conceptual framework. It can be argued,
however, that the same observed behavioral pattern could have
emerged from rational choice theory. To address this question,
we compare the persistence rate curve of the experiment (which
we call BASE for the sake of clarity) with a hypothesized
persistence curve derived from rational choice theory. Given the
same dropout rates, we simply assume that the same subjects in
our analysis behaved completely rational and chose lottery B
until period 10 and then chose lottery A in the periods 11 and 12.
Figure 5 shows the persistence curves of the baseline experiment
[BASE] and of the “as-if” rational choice subjects as Kaplan-Meier
estimates. We investigate whether the potential difference in
persistence rates is statistically signiﬁcant by using the log-rank
test, which is commonly used in survival analysis when censored
data are present [54]. The test clearly rejects the null hypothesis
that the two persistence curves are statistically the same (log-
rank χ2 ¼ 5.91, 2-sided, P ¼ 0.015). Hence, our observed data
cannot be explained by rational choice behavior.Discussion
Our conceptual framework provides a behavioral economic
model to increase the understanding of medication persistence
and allows the design of mechanisms for effective intervention
strategies. In this framework, we argue that patients follow theerence in choice behavior from one period to the
vs. 4 Period 4 vs. 5 Period 5 vs. 6 Period 6 vs. 7
56) 0.00 (1.00) 6.00 (0.11) 0.33 (0.56)
vs. 9 Period 9 vs. 10 Period 10 vs. 11 Period 11 vs. 12
00) 3.57 (0.06) 11.00 (0.00) 5.00 (0.03)
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expected beneﬁts and costs of medication intake over time. To
isolate the economic drivers of the underlying decision-making
process, we abstract from any medical context and transfer the
key components of a conventional medical treatment into an
equivalent economic investment setting. The decision environ-
ment in the investment setting differs from the medication
intake only in the fact that individuals are confronted with
economic goods rather than medication products. Framed as a
simple investment game over discrete time, we design a labo-
ratory experiment in which participating student subjects make
repeated decisions on two investment options with different risk
proﬁles and outcome probabilities. The two investment options
represent the economic equivalent of either continuing or dis-
continuing with therapy. Consistent with the predictions of our
conceptual framework, subjects continue with therapy as long as
experienced utility losses have to be compensated. As soon as
previous losses are evened out, subjects perceive the marginal
beneﬁt of compliance lower than in the beginning of the treat-
ment. Consequently, subjects start to discontinue with therapy.
It is evident from observed behavior and revealed preferences
in the laboratory that subjects’ choices are not aligned with
rational choice theory. Instead, loss aversion and the diminishing
sensitivity of future gains account for the increasing tendency of
subjects during the course of a treatment to discontinue with
therapy at a speciﬁc point in time. Incorporated in our conceptual
framework, concepts of bounded rationality and behavioral eco-
nomics seem to capture the dynamic nature of medical non-
persistence much better than do standard economic models and
generate more accurate predictions about how patients behave
under circumstances characterized by risk and uncertainty. In a
similar vein, Volpp et al. [23,25,55,56] provide evidence throughout
a series of different medical treatments that behavioral economics
explain certain behavioral patterns of patients. Those experiments
are using among others tied payments, lottery-based incentives,
lotteries and deposit contracts, social incentives, regret contest
incentives, hovering, or decision errors [23–28,56–58].
Transferred to the medical context, our ﬁndings might explain
persistence curves observed in observational studies. High per-
sistence rates typically observed in the beginning of a medical
treatment might be the result of patients’ reaction to the efforts
and costs incurred in the beginning of a new medication and
therapy. For example, new intake procedures have to be learnt
and adverse effects evolve but no beneﬁts in the form of health
state improvements cover these costs in this phase of the treat-
ment. When the medicine starts being efﬁcacious, patients want
their previous investments in their health to be compensated and
continue with medication intake because this is the least risky
action to compensate the endured losses. This behavior goes on
until patients have the impression that their previous efforts
have been completely compensated. The economic evaluation of
medication intake then starts from another status quo and
beneﬁts of future persistence are valued lower than in the past.
Consequently, patients can maintain the same utility only by
reducing the costs and therefore discontinue with therapy.
With the use of methods from experimental economics, we
provide a link between medical decision making and health
economics. Despite tremendous improvements to set a clear
taxonomy for the measurement of persistence and to establish
rigor standards for clinical and retrospective studies accordingly,
methodological issues and heterogeneity across existing studies
make it almost impossible to derive determinants of patients’
preferences and allow for testing hypotheses on patients’ behav-
iors over the course of the medical treatment. By controlling the
rules of the game in a laboratory experiment that includes
deﬁning choice sets, information conditions, and payoff struc-
tures, we can establish an environment that captures theassumptions of the economic model or the real-world situation
for a direct empirical test of the inherent predictions and system-
atically investigate the factors that might affect the individual’s
decision-making process. This advantage is especially notewor-
thy when applying the prospect theory to health-related behav-
ior. Previous attempts in that respect report mixed results
because of hypothetical situations and biased perception of
patients who are not always able to imagine themselves in
health states different from their own [59,60].
The fact that this study was conducted in the laboratory sets
some limitations to our work and warrants discussion. First,
university students who were recruited because of convenience
and cost reasons may not be the most appropriate subject pool for
studying medication persistence. They are on average younger
than medical patients and likely have not experienced severe
illnesses or chronic diseases. However, because the experiment is
not framed in a medical context and rather economic reasoning
such as evaluating the beneﬁts, costs and the risk of investment
options are investigated, this limitation may not be that severe.
Second, we created a very critical test for validating the predictions
of the conceptual framework and therefore chose a special set of
parameters with extreme risk values and high dropout rates to
maximize the saliency of the difference in risk of the two invest-
ment options. Inducing loss aversion through different working
tasks, extending the number of periods in the investment plan,
and variation in the cost-beneﬁt structure of the investment
options, along with different risk proﬁles to account for different
dropout rates, are only some suggestions for a proper sensitivity
analysis that should be used as further robustness of the current
ﬁndings. Although these steps aim to increase the internal validity
of the conceptual framework, questions about its external validity
must be addressed. Subjects made their decisions in an artiﬁcial
environment for a limited time frame. Although several exper-
imental studies provide evidence that students’ decisions over
abstract goods are not necessarily that much different from those
of the target population and their commodities under interest [61–
65], we can only speculate to what extent the observed effects
prevail outside laboratory walls. Future research in running
experiments with a medical subject pool is therefore needed to
increase the external validity of our ﬁndings.
The need for improved efﬁciency in health care delivery and
thus the need for an evidence-based, outcomes-focused, and
behavior-driven model is asking for more emphasis being put on
gathering evidence to identify the interventions that are most
effective at improving health outcomes, and then realigning the
behaviors of all stakeholders—patients, providers, manufac-
turers, and others—around these interventions. The conceptual
model and economic experiments explaining nonpersistence and
enabling mechanism designs to deliver behavioral change is a
necessary basis for the realignment. For implementation, the
conceptual model has to be speciﬁed for speciﬁc patient popula-
tions of interest to identify the inﬂuence of potential covariates
such as the type of disease, personality traits, and personal
experience on the individual hazard of medical nonpersistence.
An improved understanding of under what circumstances
patients start to discontinue with therapy is pivotal for scalable
application in real-world practice: The result of such research
would provide the components of a screening device to associate
patient- and therapy-related factors to expected behavior. It
allows identifying the behavioral segments (described by patient
characteristics, disease and disease state, and potential inter-
ventions) in which behavioral incentives can be expected to be
most effective in getting patients to adopt behaviors enabling
therapeutic interventions to be effective. Furthermore, it allows
predicting the behavior and thus effective health outcomes of
combinations of medical intervention and combinations of med-
ical and behavioral interventions in different behavioral segments.
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assessing the potential beneﬁt and risks of alternative behavioral
interventions and their ongoing performance management.
Finally, behavioral incentives can be developed to be more target-
orientated on observed behavior and effectively calibrated to
support patients in optimal medication-taking behavior. Selecting
the most effective behavioral levers for individual patient segments
and optimal intensity of the incentives is the basis of efﬁcient and
effective behavioral interventions. For broad application in real-
world practice, those mechanism designs have to be translated
into contractual design components in the context of the possible
patient-insurance contracts of a health plan or health insurance.
The utilization of a behavioral laboratory and the selection of a
student sample for this study are giving further direction, insights,
and a proof point for the development of a scalable process to
design and calibrate targeted behavioral incentives while minimiz-
ing patient research to the maximum extent possible.Conclusions
Medical nonpersistence is a worldwide problem of striking magni-
tude. We augment the research to its causes by explaining medical
nonpersistence from an economics perspective. To understand
why patients acting as economic agents tend to discontinue the
therapy at a certain point in time, we propose a conceptual
framework that is built on the principles of behavioral economics.
After having transferred the key features of a medical treatment to
an equivalent economic investment setting, we design and con-
duct a randomized economic laboratory experiment with a student
subject pool to empirically validate the rich behavioral predictions
of our conceptual framework. In line with the predictions, mental
accounting explains the observed behavioral patterns and empha-
sizes that a combination of loss aversion and different reference
points changes behavior from formerly being compliant toward
discontinuing with therapy. Incorporating these insights from
behavioral economics into possible intervention strategies prom-
ises to be as beneﬁcial as medical innovations and should be a
mandatory part of the development of any intervention aimed at
improving patients’ compliance and persistence behavior.Acknowledgments
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